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Figure 1: Default Rates for 2/28 Subprime Mortgages
by Year of Origination
Analysis conducted by economists at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston provides insight into how 
subprime mortgages became as popular as they 
did, and why they have caused the problems that 
they have.1 Below we highlight some of the key 
findings of this study. 
Data  on  2/28  hybrid  subprime  mortgages  in 
Connecticut,  Massachusetts,  and  Rhode  Island 
show that, contrary to popular belief, rate reset 
shocks have played only a minor role in subprime 
defaults so far.2 The default rate for mortgages 
originated in 2005 and 2006 is much higher than 
the default rate for 2002 mortgages. But for the 
more recent loans, the big jump in the default rate 
comes before the reset occurs (see Figure 1). No 
significant increase in defaults is seen near the 
actual reset date of 24 months.
Defaults typically occur when homeowners experi-
ence life events that prevent them from making 
timely  mortgage  payments.  Whether  a  bad  life 
event leads to foreclosure depends on whether 
there is positive or negative equity in the home. 
With  positive  equity,  foreclosure  is  unlikely.  A 
homeowner is always better off selling the home 
and pocketing the difference between the proceeds of the sale and the outstanding balance of the mortgage. 
Default rates for subprime loans rose as house prices began to level off and then decline (see Figure 2). Owners who 
had purchased their homes when prices were at their peak often found themselves with negative equity as prices fell. If 
an adverse life event occurred to an owner with negative equity, foreclosure generally followed. 
The following three characteristics of subprime loans moved in the direction that made a subprime loan originated in 
2005 more sensitive to a house-price decline than one made in 2000. First, during the housing boom, the average loan-
to-value ratio for subprime mortgages in southern New England rose rapidly, from 82.6 percent in 2000 to 92.8 percent 
by 2005 (see Table 1). Borrowers with low downpayments are more likely to find themselves with negative equity when 
house prices fall, so they are more likely to suffer a foreclosure in response to a bad life event. Second, borrowers who 
are unable or unwilling to supply documentation for their loan applications typically default more often than borrowers 
who do supply documentation. The fraction of fully documented subprime loans in the southern New England subprime 
pool fell from 69.6 percent in 2000 to 50.2 percent in 2005. Third, the average borrower’s debt-to-income ratio rose from 
37.1 percent in 2000 to 42.0 percent in 2005. 
One risk statistic that did improve in the southern New England subprime pool is the average credit score of subprime 
borrowers. However, while a FICO credit score of 620 or above might qualify a borrower for some prime loans, it would 
not qualify him for any prime loan.3 If a borrower wanted to take out a mortgage with a high loan-to-value ratio, or 
one that implied a high debt-to-income ratio, or if this borrower did not want to document his income, he would likely Federal Reserve Bank of Boston  9
Source:   Warren Group database. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston calculations.
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Table 1: Risk Characteristics of Subprime Loans in Southern New England
All borrowers       2000  2003  2005 
Number of loans originated      3,171    13,486    30,219 
Average loan-to-value ratio     82.6  88.6  92.8
Share of loans fully documented     69.6  55.5  50.2
Average debt-to-income ratio    37.1  38.9  42.0
Fraction of borrowers with FICO score of 620 or more  44.5  68.2  71.0
Borrowers with FICO score of 620 or more 
Number of loans originated     1,411    9,203   21,442 
Average loan-to-value ratio     83.8  89.8  93.8
Share of loans fully documented    67.0  48.6  40.8
Average debt-to-income ratio    36.9  38.6  41.9
Source: LP dataset for southern New England.    
1 Christopher L. Foote. “Subprime Outcomes: Turmoil in the Mortgage 
Market.” 2007 Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. Based on 
the study by Foote et al.: “Subprime Facts: What (We Think) We Know about 
the Subprime Crisis and What We Don’t.” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Public 
Policy Discussion Paper, May 2008. Both of these works and additional data and 
analysis on subprime mortgages and foreclosures from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston can be found at: http://www.bos.frb.org.
2 A hybrid adjustable-rate loan is a 30-year mortgage with a fixed interest 
rate for the first two or three years (2 years for a 2/28 loan). After this initial 
period, the interest rate “resets’’ to some fixed margin over a fluctuating 
benchmark market rate. 
3 FICO, an acronym for Fair Issac & Co., is a scoring system developed by 
Fair Isaac & Co. and widely used to evaluate the creditworthiness of borrowers. 
FICO scores range from 300 to 850, with about one-quarter of the U.S. 
population falling in the range of 750 to 799.
be turned down by a prime lender. The subprime 
market started out by providing loans only to risky 
borrowers. As the housing boom gathered steam, 
however, the market began to provide risky loans 
to a variety of borrowers. But whether the holders 
of such loans are risky borrowers or not, they share 
a high vulnerability to the decline in home prices. 
Thus, it is the recent decline in house prices that 
explains why so many recent subprime loans are 
defaulting even before the loans reset.